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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Conception of time and consciousness hereof is an issue which has been much 
debated throughout centuries. Common to all of us is the on-going world-time 
constituted in our everyday lives as minutes, days and months. We have watches to 
keep track of time, however also belonging to time are commonalities in another 
dimension. How does time appear to us? What constitutes an appearing duration of 
time? How do we perceive what has passed, in accordance to how long it is since it 
passed? Following from this, what is the function of time that has not yet passed, 
namely the future? Consequently different approaches have been taken in attempt 
to define how we are to understand time. In one of these approaches, 
phenomenology, one is not dealing with a world time in the empirical sense, but 
rather an understanding of the structural laws of how time appears to us internally. 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological study of time consciousness is arguably one of 
the more complex theories of understanding time. Dealing not exclusively with 
existing sciences, although using elements from several, Husserl developed a whole 
new theory dealing with the structure of our time-consciousness. Integrating 
specific elements from psychology, logic, ontology and epistemology, Husserl 
developed his own branch of philosophy, phenomenology, which has manifested 
itself in time studies since then (Smith, 2007:82). 
Traditionally, phenomenology is the study of phenomena. In Husserl’s own words, 
phenomenology is “the science of the essence of consciousness” (Smith, 2007:52). 
Husserl did not concern himself with whether or not objects exist, physically or 
conceptually, he only concerned himself with the way things appear to us, the 
perception of things as they consciously appear. 
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In the process of defining his own branch of phenomenology, Husserl had to 
establish certain principles and theories. Following from this is, among other things, 
his method of intentionality, his concepts of sensation and perception, duration, 
now-points, primary and secondary memory, and protention.  
However, some of his concepts can be criticized from a phenomenological and 
general standpoint. This leads to a discussion of some of his concepts and terms, 
such as phantasy
1
. Can it come up with something new, or is phantasy just a new 
way of thinking of already experienced things? In connection to phantasy, Husserl’s 
use of the term imagination is easily related to this discussion.   
How do we perceive things as they constitute themselves in consciousness?  
Another discussion point is Husserl´s concept of protention. How plausible is this 
term? Husserl claimed that protention could be constructed analogous to retention, 
is this plausible? Is it seeing the future? Or is it merely expectancy of for example 
upcoming notes? 
Where does the fine line go between what has just passed and what lies further 
back in memory? 
 
1.1   PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Raising some of these issues leads to the cardinal question: 
 
• How does the consciousness of internal time function phenomenologically 
according to Husserl?  
 
                                               
1
 This is how Husserl and the translator spell ‘fantasy’, and thus this is how it shall be presented in 
this project. 
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Ascending from the question of how time-consciousness works phenomenologically, 
there are several aspects of Husserl's phenomenology which need further 
investigation. Hence the following research questions will allow a more thorough 
elaboration on these topics:  
 
• How can phantasy come up with something new? 
• In phenomenology, how does our perception of things work? 
• If perception and phantasy are not distinct, how are they similar? 
• Is it possible to draw a clear distinction between primary and secondary 
memory? 
• Likewise, it is possible to make a similar distinction of points belonging to the 
future? 
 
1.2   MOTIVATION 
The motivation for this project is rooted in critical thoughts about how we perceive 
time. We discovered that Husserl provided a somewhat unique approach and 
presentation to consciousness of time, phenomenology. After initial research on 
Husserl and his work, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time 
(1893-1917), our focus became clearer as we wanted to figure out what Husserl’s 
intricate phenomenology is, and how it works in regard to time-consciousness. In 
addition, we will undertake the task of reconstructing the complex concepts and 
descriptions in his phenomenology in a clear and concise manner.   
 
1.3   METHODOLOGY 
We have approached Husserl’s book, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of 
internal time (1893-1917) by reconstructing the theories essential to our problem 
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definition. The project is two-fold. The first part will provide a brief history of- and 
introduction to phenomenology. In addition we will pinpoint his methods and 
concepts on the consciousness of internal time as presented in the first part, section 
A of, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), and 
in relation to our cardinal question. The second part concerns itself with critically 
assessing specific topics of Husserl’s phenomenology of the consciousness of 
internal time anchored by our research questions, and will brush upon a 
development of his phenomenology as described in section B.  
Besides Husserl’s work on time consciousness, we have consulted secondary 
literature in order to get a deeper insight in his complex theories. 
 
1.4   DIMENSIONS 
The overall theme for this semester is ‘Time, Space & Identity’. This project meets 
the criteria for this theme, in the sense that Husserl's, On the phenomenology of the 
consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), concerns itself with our internal 
consciousness of time. 
 
This project covers the two dimensions ‘Subjectivity and Learning’ and ‘Science and 
Philosophy’, as the project deals with complex philosophical matters exemplified by 
Husserl’s phenomenology, and all that it encompasses. Thus the dimension ‘Science 
and Philosophy’ is covered.  
The dimension ‘Subjectivity and Learning’ is covered as the project is dealing with 
phenomena as they appear to one in first person. This project is concerned with our 
impression of reality and the structure hereof. This means that it deals with 
subjective first person experiences containing common structures in the way time 
appears to us. 
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1.5   DELIMITATIONS 
This project will not focus on any other philosophers than Edmund Husserl. Nor will 
it discuss any other works by Husserl’s, than On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). The first part of this project will deal 
exclusively with Section A in, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time (1893-1917). This means that development on various phenomenological 
matters beyond Section A is not of concern for this project. The second part will use 
parts of Section B, with relevance to our assessments and critique of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. This excludes a chronological approach to Husserl's work. Likewise, 
any attempt or concern of dating the various notes constituting On the 
phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), is not of 
relevance to this project. In conclusion, as Husserl does not concern himself with 
psychological matters, besides Brentano’s theories on time-consciousness, 
sensation and phantasy, neither will this project. 
 
 
PART ONE 
 
In part one we will provide an account of Husserl´s theories on the analysis of time-
consciousness. In order to do so, a general description to his concepts will be given 
in a simplified and understandable manner. This will consequently uncover the 
essentials of how Husserl´s internal time-consciousness is to be understood. 
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CHAPTER 2: EDMUND HUSSERL 
 
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl was born in Prossnitz in Moravia April 8
th
 1859. In 
1938, 79 years later, he died in Freiburg, Germany. He studied astronomy, 
mathematics, physics and philosophy in Leipzig from 1876-78, and from 1878-81 he 
continued these studies in Berlin. In January 1883 he received his PhD in 
mathematics in Vienna, with main focus on the theory of variations
2
.  
When taking his PhD, Husserl became the assistant of Weierstrass, his former 
teacher in mathematics. In 1884-86 Husserl studied philosophy in Vienna under 
Brentano. When Husserl had finished studying under Brentano his new teacher 
became Carl Stumpf, who was another former student of Brentano. In 1891, Husserl 
published his first monograph, Philosophy of Arithmetic. After publishing this he 
received critique from Frege, which made him change his field of interest from 
psychology to phenomenology. In this process Husserl developed the method that 
he is known for today, namely phenomenology
3
.  
During his life Husserl only published five books. After his death, volumes from 
lecture texts and about 40.000 pages of notes, concerned with among other things, 
time, intersubejctivity and space were found (Smith, 2007:11). His work, On the 
phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917), is based on notes 
and transcriptions from Husserl’s lectures. These notes, edited and compiled by 
Edith Stein, Husserl's assistant, are from different years. At times this makes 
Husserl's trail of thought seem rather incoherent. Thus, a consistent or chronological 
development is hard to trace, in his work On the phenomenology of the 
consciousness of internal time (1893-1917),(Husserl, 1991:XIV-XV). 
                                               
2
 ”Edmund Husserl” May 22
nd
 2009 - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#LifWor   
3
 ”Edmund Husserl” May 22
nd
 2009 - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#LifWor  
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Initially Husserl’s main concern in philosophy revolved around the empirical 
thought. Around year 1900 Husserl changed his view in philosophy from the 
empirical to the transcendental trail of thought, which is when something goes 
ahead of experience and determines its character (Lübcke, 1983:198). 
In 1928 Husserl retired but he continued to write and give lectures until the rise of 
Nazism. Consequently, he was prohibited from both lecturing and publishing in 
1933. 
 
 
2.1   INTENTIONALITY: CENTRE FOR HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY 
 2.1.1    HISTORY OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
The history of phenomenology can be divided into two parts and here it will serve as 
an introduction to the discipline as Husserl made use of it. The two parts consist of a 
history of the term, and a history of the discipline. The term was originally defined 
by German scientist Johann Heinrich Lambert in the 18
th
 century, and hereafter 
mentioned several times by Kant in his works. However, the publishing of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of spirit is arguably where the history of the term set off
4
.  
By the 19
th
 century, there was made an effort by some philosophers to distance 
phenomenology from psychology. Psychology revolved around analyzing data, 
whereas newly established discipline, phenomenology, should be used to study 
ourselves and our experiences. This was a justified detachment from psychology and 
arguably where the history of the discipline began, with Husserl in front.  
Husserl was inspired by his former professor, the German philosopher and 
psychologist Franz Brentano who was also looking at structures of the mind. 
                                               
4
 ”From Phenomena to Phenomenology” April 14
th
  2009 - 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#3  
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Although Husserl firmly rejected a psychological stance in his analysis, he elaborated 
on some of Brentano’s theories in the development of his own. By 1889 Franz 
Brentano used phenomenology to define his ‘descriptive psychology’. Although 
Brentano was not exercising phenomenology as a method, Husserl would elaborate 
on his concept of intentionality in the making of his own theories. This led to the rise 
of Phenomenology as a philosophical, scientific discipline
5
. To draw a conclusion 
from the history; what we today know of phenomenology goes back to Husserl who 
relied on Brentano, Husserl did not rely on Hegel, and thus the history of the term 
before Husserl’s epoch was not important to him.  
Phenomenology is a complex method; hence this project must devote some lines for 
general introduction of the discipline. “Phenomenology is the study of structures of 
consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view”
6
. Through 
phenomenological descriptions we explicitly present former implicit structures. 
Traditionally phenomenology is the study of phenomena, the theoretical excluded 
description of things as they appear to one (Lübcke, 1983:98). This means the 
exclusion of all previous knowledge one have concerning phenomena.  As one 
studies the phenomenon as it appears to one in first person singular, it is important 
to exclude all former theoretical knowledge one may have concerning the object. 
According to Husserl the practice of phenomenology is present whenever we are 
reflecting upon things such as, how do I feel, what do I think, and then answering 
the questions in first person by defining what I feel, think etc. (Smith, 2007:189). 
 A short description of what phenomena means to Husserl will clarify the use of the 
term in this project; the uses of the term phenomena are many, and cross over 
many discourses and disciplines, however in Husserl’s case it means “objective 
                                               
5
 ”From Phenomena to Phenomenology” April 14
th
  2009 - 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#3  
6
 “Phenomenology” April 22
nd
 2009 -  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/  
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intentional contents (sometimes called intentional objects) of subjective acts of 
consciousness”
7
. Or rephrased and simplified as following; the things we experience 
in the world subjectively, objectified by common structures in the way they appear 
to us.  
The analysis of time consciousness, as this project concerns, is said to be the most 
difficult of all phenomenological problems (Husserl, 1991:XVIII). 
The actual thing, the actual world time and real time are not tasks for the method of 
phenomenology, seen as the real existence of a world time does not concern 
phenomenology however not denying it. In phenomenology we accept the existence 
of phenomena and a world around us, but we do not address any attention to the 
real existence of these. Phenomenology according to Husserl is only concerned with 
the appearing time, appearing phenomena and appearing duration, such as 
successions, as they appear to one (Husserl, 1991:4). The concept of day and minute 
do not tell us what time is. In order to explain what time is from a phenomenological 
stance we have to look at our perception of time and this will be the main focus in 
this project. 
  
2.2   INTENTIONALITY 
As suggested by Jaakko Hintikka, a Finnish philosopher and logician and the writer 
of, The phenomenological dimension
8
, one can say that Husserl’s phenomenology 
was a theory of intentionality (Smith, Smith, 1995:78). A description of intentionality 
and Husserl’s use of it, is thus important since it is closely related to his 
phenomenology, and these two concepts appear inseparable in his method. They 
appear inseparable in Husserl’s method, as intentionality is arguably the most 
                                               
7
 ”From Phenomena to Phenomenology”  May 5
th
 2009 - 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#3 
8
 “Jaakko Hintikka” May 4
th
 2009 - http://www.bu.edu/philo/faculty/hintikka.html  
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essential part of the structure of experiences we have and thus helped us to make 
phenomenological descriptions of different phenomena. “The central structure of an 
experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an 
experience of or about some object”
9
.  
Intentionality is a method which is used to describe the relation mind has to its 
object. In order to understand this specific relation one have to pay attention to two 
important points; first the mind structures and second that intentionality is not the 
relation to how things are in the world but how they are conceived.  
Intentionality is the relationship between what is directed at an object and the 
object itself. It concerns how the mind is directed at something and not vice versa 
(Lübcke, 1983:216). Exemplified phenomenologically as following; say one’s mind is 
directed toward a conceptual object then how the mind is directed at this 
conceptual object is called intentionality. Here it is important to stress that it is 
conceptual objects we deal with in phenomenology, hence it is not actual objects 
but it is objects as we conceive them. The mind is stretching out to gain knowledge 
on the conceptual object. “Intentionality has to do with the directedness or 
aboutness of mental states – that fact that, for example, one’s thinking is of or 
about something”
10
. It is relevant for the second part of this project to exemplify 
intentionality in relation to phantasy by stating that the relation between one’s 
thought and say, a red non-existing book is one’s intentional imagination. Thus we 
should be able to analyze objects in our minds even though they do not exist. More 
attention will be paid to phantasy later in the project.  
To get a better understanding of this complex method and form a general view of 
the method of both phenomenology and intentionality it can be an advantage to 
                                               
9
 ”Phenomenology” April 22
nd
  2009 - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/  
10
 ”Consciousness and Intentionality” April 22
nd
  2009 - 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/  
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make use of Husserl’s model of bracketing, this idea is used and explained by David 
Woodruff Smith. Smith is from the Department Chair, Philosophy and School of 
Humanities at University of California. He received his PhD, from Stanford University 
and made research both in phenomenology, Edmund Husserl and intentionality. His 
main area of interest is the philosophy of the mind, which makes his research and 
works interesting to this project
11
. 
 The idea of bracketing is to look at objects as we conceive them, and hence the idea 
is useful to get a better understanding of the method intentionality. The concept 
intentionality comes from the word intentio which is the opposite of extentio. To 
explain these two concepts and to distinguish them, one can make use of Frege’s 
known example with the morning and the evening star which is seen as one and the 
same star in extentio but is separated in intentio to be the morning and the evening 
star. As suggested by Frege we look at the object as we conceive it here and now in 
intentio, first in the morning and following in the evening. We pay no attention to 
the assumption of the real object and thus the result is two different stars. In 
extentio we make use of logic and theory and hence conclude that it actually is the 
same star just observed at different points. According to Husserl we take for granted 
that there is a world around us and we devote too little time to perceive things 
distinct from the assumption of it. As aforementioned Husserl wants us to perceive 
phenomena and make theoretical excluded descriptions, without making any use of 
the assumption of a world around us. He does not want us to deny it; but on the 
contrary just continue to accept it without making any use of the assumption of a 
world. We should not focus on whether the world exists but to understand how 
things are perceived in the world. Hence what becomes important is our mind’s 
relation to how we perceive things in the world and not the relation between our 
                                               
11
 “David W. Smith” May 4
th
 2009 -  http://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=2508  
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mind and the world. As Husserl suggests in his idea of bracketing he wants us to put 
the assumption of a world around us in brackets. This way we get a ‘pure’ and 
‘clean’ consciousness. Smith elaborates on Husserl’s method of bracketing as 
following: 
 
• The general thesis of the natural attitude is the implicit thesis that there exists a world 
around me, in which I and my activities occur. 
• In order to shift my attention away from things in the world around me, I bracket, and so 
make no use of, the general thesis of the natural attitude. 
• I then attend to my consciousness of things in the world. 
• In this modified attitude toward the world, I give phenomenological descriptions of various 
types of experience just as I experience them (Smith, 2007:241-242). 
 
To elaborate on this phenomenological method in terms of the theory of 
intentionality, Husserl changes item one and elaborates on item four whereas item 
two and three remain the same as above mentioned. He thereby supports the 
aforementioned idea, that his phenomenology is a theory of intentionality: 
 
• My consciousness is usually a consciousness of something. 
• (…) 
• (…) 
• In this modified attitude toward the world, I give phenomenological descriptions of various 
types of experience just as I experience them, where these descriptions characterize the 
contents or meanings of such experiences, presenting objects as experienced, regardless of 
whether the objects represented by these meanings exist (Smith, 2007:243). 
 
To answer the problem definition it is of vital importance to stress how the mind 
functions phenomenologically and to elaborate on the method behind 
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phenomenological descriptions – intentionality. The idea of bracketing is useful 
when stressing how the consciousness of internal time functions 
phenomenologically since it is a complex theory to exclude all former knowledge 
and any assumption of a world around us and only focus on the immanent, what is 
in consciousness. In the following chapter it will be explained how Husserl excluded 
the concept of ‘actual objective time’, similar to the aforementioned example of 
bracketing the assumption of an actual world around us, and only focus on the 
consciousness of internal time.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3: SENSATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS IN TIME 
 
3.1   EXCLUSION OF OBJECTIVE TIME 
When Husserl was approaching phenomenology in relation to time consciousness 
his starting point was to exclude the concept of a single, “actual objective time” 
(Husserl, 1991:4). Having bracketed the world and time around us, the focus shifts 
to how we perceive it internally. Accordingly, subjectivity is not an issue as one is 
not dealing with subjective views of the world around us, but with objective 
commonalities in the way time appears to us, independent of the world around us. 
In short, this leads to the following approach to time-investigation: 
 
•
 The idea of time as an infinite on-going process, beyond our ascribed 
consciousness of it, is indeed an abstract thought. 
 
•
 Categorizing time into entities such as days or minutes does not help 
the cause of understanding time inside us either.  
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•
 Therefore, in order to acquire a true, objective way of grasping time, 
one must look at what is objective within consciousness, the structure 
of how one perceives time. As referred to in Husserl’s phenomenology, 
what is immanent to consciousness (Husserl, 1991:4-5).
  
 
As this proposes that there is common, true objectivity in the way time appears to 
us, as stated above, it also necessitates that how time appears to us cannot be 
investigated from the outside, empirically, but only within ourselves, 
phenomenologically.  
 
3.2   SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 
Following from the method of bracketing and in regards to how one is to perceive 
time in consciousness, Husserl classifies everything one experiences into two 
categories: sensation and perception. The reason for this division must be seen in 
context to the essence of phenomenology, unveiling common structural laws of 
things as they appear to us. With so many experiences and impressions gathered in 
the world around us, one needs a clear distinction for what is phenomenology, 
things as they appear to us in consciousness, and what is not.  
In order to comprehend the terms sensation and perception, a simple introduction 
to them will allow for further elaboration in a more complex context, namely in 
relation to time.  
 
To the realm of sensation Husserl attributes feelings, for instance pain, and 
secondary qualities such as smells, and colors. These concepts do not have an 
object, and are thus somewhat excluded in phenomenology. For example, the 
immediate sensation of pain relates neither to the cause of it, nor to where it may 
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hurt, but only to the occurring sensation (Husserl, 1991:6-7). We are not consciously 
reflecting upon the pain as it occurs. Hence, a hard kidney punch might cause 
grieving pain to one, but does not present any information in regards to one’s 
conception of pain or the structural laws hereof. We say somewhat excluded due to 
the fact that a more complex example of sensation in Husserl’s terminology 
complicates a full exclusion. Husserl claimed that concepts such as colors and smells 
belonged in perception in the sense that they are part of the objects perceived. He 
substantiates this by claiming that they undergo a process named apprehension.  
This apprehension process is far from easily comprehensible and shall be discussed 
in greater length in the second part of this project. In addition, Husserl mentions 
sensed tones in his own terminology. However, as this is a complex nearly 
contradictory example, It will also be dealt with in the second part of the project. 
Thus the focus shifts to perception. 
Perception is in most general terms, observing or focusing on a thing. In contrast to 
sensation, perception is closely connected to intentionality as we have objects for 
what we perceive. For instance, the perception of a table has a table as object. Of 
course, in phenomenology, a real world table is not the concern, but rather our 
conceptualization of it. Keeping in mind that things are appearing in consciousness 
via perception and intentionality, and also that entities in sensation have no object, 
Husserl concludes that perception is the method for uncovering phenomenological 
structures (Husserl, 1991:8). To additionally illuminate how sensation and 
perception distinct themselves from one another, Husserl gives an example of 
holding a piece of chalk in one's hand. The piece of chalk feels smooth. Looking at 
the chalk then, if one closes and then opens their eyes it would result in two 
perceptions, but one and the same sensation of smoothness (Husserl, 1991:8).  
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As a final remark, one could also say that sensation is individualized by a process, 
whereas perception is individualized by an object. Perception presents a thing in 
consciousness, and sensation does not. 
 
In order to understand why Husserl needed this division of experiences in his 
phenomenology, one must necessarily brush upon the theories of various 
psychologists down to Brentano (Husserl, 1991:12). Accordingly, in Brentano's view 
everything we experience and think hereof are sensations: 
 
“Many believe that the question about the origin of the concept of time does not have 
to be answered differently from the question about the origin of our concepts of 
colors, sounds and the like. Just as we sense a color, so too we sense the duration of a 
color; like quality and intensity, temporal duration is also an immanent moment of 
sensation” (Husserl, 1991:12).  
Brentano's theory, as reconstructed by Husserl, seems to claim the following: 
• “The external stimulus excites the quality through the form physical 
processes” (Husserl, 1991:12+13).  
Stimulus meaning the object we see or focus on and quality being a color, or a tone. 
• “The intensity of that quality is excited by its kinetic energy” (Husserl, 
1991:12).  
For example the intensity of a tone. 
• “The subjectively sensed duration of a sensation is excited through its 
continuation” (Husserl, 1991:12).  
This quote should be self-evident. 
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Husserl strongly objected to this stance. As Brentano’s theory is not expounded on in 
any particularity, this is merely an assumed meaning of it. It is still unclear from 
Husserl’s text how sensations such as smells or colors fit in to this view of Brentano, 
and hence it shall not be elaborated on in this text either. However, it does provide a 
standpoint for Husserl to introduce a more refined view on things.  
Following from Brentano’s theory, Husserl stressed the need for a more perceptually 
refined view on things. Husserl made an effort to clarify this in an example of 
succeeding tones. He dismissed Brentano’s theory of sensation, illustrated by an 
example of succeeding tones. If it is the external stimulus that excites the qualities of 
a thing, this infers that sensations die out with the stimuli causing them. As the 
previous tones slip further away from consciousness, new ones constitute 
themselves. Thus, pushed back tones are no longer accountable in consciousness, 
assuming they disappear with the stimuli producing them (Husserl, 1991:13). 
The fact that the stimulus endures still does not mean that the sensation is sensed as 
enduring; it means only that the sensation also endures. And this is equally true of 
succession. The succession of sensations and the sensation of succession are not the 
same (Husserl, 1991:12). 
Here Husserl claims that in order to comprehend the succession of tones 
phenomenologically, the tone most recent in mind and must not appear to endure 
as it is, but be refined from moment to moment. A succession of sensations in the 
quote above means a succession of tones. If just passed tones were to be preserved 
in memory while new tones were continuously being presented, succeeding 
sensations in the sense of Brentano's term of them, would in fact appear as an 
(un)melodic chaos of different and/or enduring tones. The fact that the tones 
succeed one another does not imply that we have an actual graspable perceived 
 - 20 - 
succession of them. Although Husserl acknowledged the possibility that succession 
of sensations and even enduring sensations may take place without one's awareness 
of it, it naturally does not produce anything relevant to phenomenology as we are 
not consciously aware of it. Therefore, Husserl needed a more refined concept 
towards observing things, namely perception (Husserl, 1991:13).    
Husserl differentiated between perception of an external thing and perception of an 
immanent thing. Following from this, Husserl defined the process of perceiving of an 
external thing as: 
 
• “The appearance of something external. 
• The constituting consciousness in which the appearance of something 
external becomes constituted as something immanent” (Husserl, 1991:100-
101). 
• The turning-towards, or focus on what appears.    
  
Although Husserl has reduced phenomenology to an investigation of the internal 
structures of appearances, he did not exclude the existence of real world objects. 
Although seeing a table is not phenomenology as such, the act of perceiving it is. 
However, as it shall be shown in chapter 5.4 Apprehension, external perception is 
closely linked to sensation-concepts such as colors.  
 
On the other hand, one’s perception of an internal object, Husserl seemed to 
classify as two things: 
 
• “The internal consciousness of the unitary immanent object, consciousness 
that is on hand even without our turning towards the object, namely, as the 
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consciousness that constitutes what is in time” (Husserl, 1991:100).   
• Consciousness of an internal object which we purposely direct our attention 
and understanding to (Husserl, 1991:100).  
 
Husserl is unclear about these two uses. He does not seem to exclude one of them 
in his text. One could assume that he wanted to show that one could compose a 
melody not heard before internally, thus not needing an object placed in the ‘real 
world’ in order to use perception in this regard. One’s consciousness would simply 
stretch out to the new tones as they were played. However, this could also be 
explained by his concept of phantasy. Phantasy shall be elaborated on in the second 
part of the project. 
In conclusion, sensation strictly speaking involves feelings whereas perception is 
merely observing things, internally or externally. When perceiving an object, the 
object presents itself as enduring in time. This implies that perception is 
dependent on both future and past. Hence, one uses perception, not sensation 
when dealing with how time appears to us in consciousness. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING OF DURATION  
 
There are several ways in which we understand time. There is the physical linear 
time, measured by watches and shared by most of us in the way we understand 
time. This understanding is common, but not in the field of phenomenology. On the 
contrary, our internal consciousness concerning time is what Husserl put to 
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importance in his work. One of the great tasks Husserl took on is how we perceive 
the duration in time. In Husserl’s phenomenology, he introduced concepts that give 
us a tool for understanding the duration in time as we perceive it internally. These 
concepts are now-points, retention, protention and memory. The following contains 
a presentation and interpretation of these and moreover how these are linked in 
memory. Furthermore this chapter contains a subsection where Husserl’s example of 
tones will be elaborated on. He used this in order to exemplify his phenomenology of 
the internal time-consciousness as it provides a way of apprehending how time 
passes by and thereby gives us something graspable to relate to.  
Duration is something more than just presence and must be separated from the 
awareness of just one point in time for instance a ‘now’. But we as humans are 
aware of time in the past or in the future and periods of time as well, and what 
Husserl does, is to introduce a terminology which makes it possible to comprehend 
this duration. He also makes it explicit that there is a distinction between for instance 
different points in the past or different kinds of memory, primary and secondary 
respectively. This chapter elaborates on these concepts he introduces and makes the 
connection between them explicit.  
Following from this, we present the following schedule in order to provide a clear 
overview of these concepts, and the understanding hereof: 
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Husserl does not make the different terms as clear as the reader would probably 
like, thus we will now specify it as we understand the connections between 
retention, protention, recollection, and introduce a term we here will call 
anticipation. 
Retention and recollection both belong to the past, but differs in the sense that 
retention is an unconscious act close to the ‘now’ whereas recollection is a 
conscious act actively presented far from the ‘now’. Then we have protention and 
anticipation which both belong to the future but differs in the same way as 
retention and recollection. Protention is an unconscious act close to the 'now' and 
anticipation an act actively presented far from the 'now'. 
Retention and protention are the actions close to the present ‘now’ or as Husserl 
labels it: Now-points. Retention is a past now-point, meaning a ‘now’ that has just 
been perceived whereas protention is what one unconsciously expect will happen 
next. 
Recollection and anticipation are actions far from the present now-point. To give an 
example of how they work, one could try to think of the last summer holiday and 
bring present the experiences. Then think of the next summer holiday. How is it 
 PAST FUTURE 
CLOSE 
Naturally felt 
Retention 
 
Protention 
FAR 
Actively presented 
Recollection Anticipation 
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going to be and which experiences is one expecting to get? Those are conscious acts 
which one uses to find already experienced events from the past and expected 
happenings in the future.  
Having provided an overview of how the concepts function, it still needs further 
elaboration. For instance, Husserl fails to clearly display where the retention slips 
into recollection. This will be further discussed in the second part of the project. 
In the following subchapter Husserl’s concept of what he designates as now-points 
will be introduced and described more thoroughly. 
 
4.1   NOW-POINTS 
As mentioned above, Husserl’s method of understanding the perception of duration, 
necessitate a clarification of some of the concepts. First we will have to look into the 
concept of a now-point, in order to understand retention and protention. Husserl 
also refers to these now-points as time-points or temporal data (Husserl, 1991:29), 
but never really elaborates on a distinction between them, if there is any. Obviously 
there can only be one phenomenological idea of a now-point at the time. When a 
now-point is replaced by a new now-point, the replaced now-point becomes a past 
now-point, which means that it does no longer exist in the same present form. This 
means that we can only perceive one now-point at the time. According to Husserl, 
the already existing now-point is being pushed into the past by a new emerged now-
point. Figuratively speaking, one can imagine a series of now-points as beads on a 
string, every bead being a now-point. There are infinitely many beads on the string, 
stretching out from the past into the future. To elaborate on this picture of the 
beads, one could visualize the now-point as being right in front of one and the string 
of beads hanging vertically down. Now picture someone pulling the string 
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downwards, so the bead or the now-point right in front of you is being pulled down 
into the past, giving room for yet another new bead from above, which is the future.  
In order to fully understand Husserl’s explanation on the perception of the duration 
in time, it is necessary to have several concepts to lean on to, and the next in line 
will be, another often used concept in Husserl's lectures and presentations of 
internal time-consciousness, retention (Husserl, 1991:29-30). 
 
4.2   RETENTION 
Hold on to the picture of the beads on the string. Imagine the beads just below the 
now-point or the ones that has just been a now-point, to be retention. Now imagine 
that a new now-point arises, then the old now-point becomes retention, and then 
that retention becomes retention of retention and so on. When the replaced now-
point no longer appears as a now-point, it passes over into retention (Husserl, 
1991:31). Now-points that we perceive changes into retention, they do not 
disappear. The now-point is modified and thus now exists as retention of the primal 
impression, the impression with no former theoretical assumptions. It is important 
to stress that the retention and the new now-point equally exist at the same time. 
Husserl used an example of tones to exemplify this, “While it is actually present 
itself (but not as an actually present tone), it is retention of the tone that has been” 
(Husserl, 1991:31). Husserl used the example of tones throughout his lectures in 
1905, thus there will be a more thorough description of this in chapter 4.6. 
Therefore as new now-points keep arising, “(...) it changes into retention of 
retention and does so continuously” (Husserl, 1991:31).  
When a now-point is modified into retention it has undergone a small change, 
caused by the duration of time. So even though two time-points next to each other 
may look the same, they will always have been altered. Husserl refers to this 
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modification as a continuum; a series of time-points are very much alike, yet the first 
and the last time-point are very different from each other. It changes and passes 
over from the impressional consciousness into the ever new retentional 
consciousness (Husserl, 1991:31). Husserl uses the concept of retention in a number 
of different connections when concerned with the internal time-consciousness, and 
the above mentioned is just a small extract of it. In the next subchapter, 4.2.1, a 
presentation of how retention functions in memory will follow. 
What is gained with this explanation is a tool for being able to discuss and analyze 
the duration of time as we perceive it. It is without importance for what actually 
happens, but what is important is that it opens up a possibility for being able to 
describe the different points and the duration in time in the internal time-
consciousness. Furthermore it is now possible to discuss how retention works in 
memory. 
 
 4.2.1    RETENTION AS PRIMARY MEMORY 
With this simplified explanation of the concept of retention it is now possible to put 
retention in relation to memory; one of Husserl’s key issues within time-
consciousness. Husserl makes a distinction between primary and secondary memory 
and categorises retention as primary memory (Husserl, 1991:32). Primary and 
secondary memory will be elaborated on in the following sections.  
Primary memory can be understood in connection to our primal impressions. Our 
primal impressions we get when we open our eyes and ears and sense our 
surroundings, are our perception of things, but still not entirely. As Husserl claims: 
“(...) we have immanent objects in view here, which properly speaking are not 
constituted in a ‘perception’” (Husserl, 1991:32), but they can be looked at in the 
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same way as the perceptions we get when we open our eyes and ears. The primary 
memory continuously attaches itself to the ‘impression’ (Husserl, 1991:32). As 
mentioned above, Husserl thus claims that the impressional consciousness changes 
into being retentional consciousness. The impressional consciousness is always 
flowing and should be understood as the moment of ‘now’, always instantaneously 
undergoing a modification into a ‘having-been’-point, namely retention. Husserl 
stresses that the series of points in retention must be seen as linked together. These 
points are not separated or can be pulled out of their order; they maintain their 
place in the consciousness no matter how many new now-points arise. It functions 
the same way as a comet moving forward with a tail of dust and stones being pulled 
out behind the comet, leaving an ever growing longer tail. The comet is the primal 
impression (the now-point) and the tail is the modified now-points that have turned 
into retention. Retention attaches itself to the perception of the moment (Husserl, 
1991:37).  
So the essence of this section is that ‘past’ and ‘now’ exclude one another. They 
both exist, but at different places in the internal time-order. As Husserl formulates 
it: “What is remembered, of course, does not now exist – otherwise it would not be 
something that has been but something present; and in memory (retention) it is not 
given as ‘now’, otherwise memory, or retention, would precisely not be memory but 
perception (or, respectively, primal impression)” (Husserl, 1991:36). 
 
Although, retention deals with recent memory in context to time consciousness, it is 
important to stress that it only deals with recent memory. Where the line goes 
between what is fresh in consciousness and what is reproduced in memory is vague, 
and thus Husserl presents the concept of secondary memory, in order to separate 
the two. 
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4.3   SECONDARY MEMORY 
Secondary memory is the act of recollection. It differs from primary memory in the 
way that it needs one’s intentional will and act in order to ‘find’ what is searched for 
in the mind. Retention is present all the time, but without any need for one to think 
about it. 
Secondary memory is also a reproduction of temporal objects. Husserl puts it like 
this: “Just as representations can attach themselves immediately to perceptions, 
they can also occur independently without being joined to perceptions, and these 
are secondary memories” (Husserl, 1991:37). 
‘Nows’ appear in both retention and recollection, but they are treated in two 
different ways. In retention they are perceived and in recollection they are 
represented. Retention belongs to the present, hence, every object that appears in 
the ‘now’ is perceived. Opposite, recollection belongs to the past and has to draw 
the wanted past ‘now’ from memory into the present, and is thereby representing 
the ‘now’ (in the actual ‘now’). 
Phenomenologically speaking all our memories in recollection can be called 
enduring objectivities in the sense that they are stable structures. The memories will 
stay in our minds for a long time and can be dragged into the present whenever we 
wish to do so. We make our experiences keep on existing. Retention, on the other 
hand, does not produce enduring objectivities. It only holds in consciousness what 
has just been perceived. 
Husserl claimed that recollection can occur in two different forms of 
accomplishment. Either the memory shows to us in a simple grasping, it suddenly 
arises and we look at what is remembered in a flash. In this case the memory is 
vague. Or we reproduce the whole episode over again as a repetition. In other 
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words, we represent the episode and perceive it all over again. This act, Husserl 
called the ‘freedom of reproduction’. We can handle the reproduction as we wish; 
more fast, more slowly, in small bits, distinctly, unclear and so forth. But the more 
we do that, the more the succession of time-points in that specific memory sinks 
further and further back in time and becomes gradually obscure. As time goes on, 
this can make it difficult for one to remember the episode as it were (Husserl, 
1991:49-51).  
After this presentation of the two different kinds of memory, we have established a 
basic understanding of how the duration of time after the ‘now’ is perceived 
internally. The next step is to look into how the perception of the future is 
interpreted by Husserl. 
 
4.4   PROTENTION 
Husserl integrates a notion of the future into his understanding of internal time and 
duration, namely protention. This subsection will give a short description of what 
protention is. The concept of protention and the question of whether or not it is 
valid will be discussed later in the project. Protention can be seen as analogous to 
retention and stretches out in the opposite direction from the now-point. It must be 
included in an analysis of time consciousness, since it adds another dimension in the 
observation of internal time. Within phenomenology it is important to stress that 
one is dealing with a scale in the internal order of time consciousness. If we recall 
the image of the beads on the string, we can imagine protention to be the beads 
waiting to become a now-point.  
When talking of protention and thus implicitly the future, one could even consider 
expectations or anticipation to be part of this. Later in the project there will be a 
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more thorough discussion and elaboration on the concept of protention and 
whether or not it is plausible phenomenologically speaking.   
 
4.5 HUSSERL’S DIAGRAM OF TIME 
When having explained the concepts of now-points, retention and protention 
Husserl introduced a diagram to make the duration in time and running-off 
phenomena more comprehensible, however one could argue that this is not the 
case and that he complicates matters even further. We will give an explanation, 
problematize the complex issues of the diagram, and make a new suggestion on 
this, based on David Woodruff Smith’s interpretation of it.  
 
Husserl speaks of ‘modes of temporal orientation’ or ‘running-off phenomena’ as 
mentioned above (Husserl, 1991:29). He explains the running-off phenomenon as a 
‘continuity of constant changes’ (Husserl, 1991:29). This phenomenon is in its form 
unchangeable. Husserl stresses that every now-point is different from one another, 
that no now-point are equally the same. Furthermore he explains that as no 
moment in time can occur more than once, neither can a running-off mode occur 
more than once. In Husserl’s phenomenology a running-off phenomenon is what 
happens when time goes by. This will be explained further in the diagram below 
which will show us “the double continuity of running-off modes” (Husserl, 1991:30).  
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(Husserl, 1991:29) 
 
According to Husserl’s diagram of time, the dots on the diagram are now-points; the 
line from A to E is therefore a series of now-points. The dot below P is also a now-
point, but this one is sinking into the past as a running-off phenomenon, it is a past 
now-point, as explained above. The past now-point is still present in retention even 
though it is no longer a now-point, as it sinks into the past (Husserl, 1991:30). 
According to Husserl the now-points are not present at the same time, at the same 
level, but at the same time as in the now-point and the past now-point. This diagram 
is an image of how we can remember things that are not happening in the moment. 
As mentioned earlier, this diagram also shows why phenomenology matters. For 
example phenomenology describes how we are able to have a conversation or listen 
to music. This will be further explained below, when looking into an example of 
succeeding tones given by Husserl in his lectures.  
A P E 
P´ 
A´ 
A E 
A 
AE – the series of now-points. 
 
AA´- Sinking into the past. 
 
EA´- Continuum of phases (Now-
point with horizon of the past). 
 
E  - the series of nows perhaps  
filled with other objects.  
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As Husserl’s diagram of time, can be somewhat hard to comprehend, David 
Woodruff Smith elaborates on this and introduces another diagram, which he calls: 
“The structure of my consciousness of time” (Smith, 2007:213). As Smith introduces 
this new proposal for a more comprehensible diagram, he gives the same 
explanation as Husserl does in his book, on the phenomenology of the consciousness 
of internal time (1893-1917). Hence we will explain this diagram as we understand it; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When hearing a tone, one has an experience of a primal impression and at the same 
time one retains the tone. These retentions remain a series of retentions of previous 
tones, but they do not necessarily go all the way back to the beginning of the song. 
If we listen to a song, we are familiar with, we have an unconscious expectation of 
another tone to follow, and this is what is mentioned earlier as protention. One is 
both conscious in retention of the tone and the past hearing of the tone, the same 
goes for protention (Smith, 2007:212).  
Protention 
 
 
Impression of 
tone T 0 
 
 
Retention 
 
 
 
Now (T 0) 
One half-second 
Future impression of 
tone T +1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future time (T +1) 
Past impression 
of tone T –1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Past time (T -1) 
(Smith, 2007: 213) 
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 Hence what we understand by Smith’s model is that first we have an impression of a 
tone that modifies into having a past impression of the tone, which is retention. 
When listening to music we know, we then have a future impression of the tone 
which is protention. When looking at this diagram, made by Smith, one will find that 
it lacks the double continuality that Husserl’s diagram provides us with. In the 
absence of this double continuality it is rather difficult to understand the model and 
what Smith is actually trying to explain with it. Another issue with the diagram is 
that Smith determines that a now-point lasts for half a second. As we understand it, 
it makes no sense to try and determine the duration of a now-point. Thus as we 
interpret it based on Husserl, there is no measurable starting and ending point in a 
now-point and also there will always appear another now-point, as the series of 
now-points is infinite. 
 
4.6    MUSIC AS AN EXAMPLE OF DURATION 
Time is a part of the essence of consciousness. To understand this 
phenomenologically, Husserl presented an example of succeeding tones. When 
perceiving a melody we hear every single tone; the first, the second, the third and so 
forth. Every tone has a temporal extension itself; the tone starts in an actually ‘now’ 
but becomes immediately past and sinks deeper and deeper into it. But the same 
tone keeps on sounding in an ever new ‘now’. Each tone is heard in the context of 
the previous and anticipated tones. 
Hence, the perceiving of a melody is in a part memory, in a smaller part perception 
and in a further part protention (Husserl, 1991:25). 
Let us try to analyze this example more deeply. If we heard every single tone in 
isolation from the others, we would not experience a melody but simply punctual 
sounds. But the way in which we can hear the melody, is if the previous tones 
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remain present for us while listening to the following tones. According to Husserl, 
this is retention. The just perceived tone is now past but can still be reproduced in 
recollection as if it were new. This means that recollection can not present a present 
tone, but precisely a tone ‘primarily remembered’ in the ‘now’ (Husserl, 1991:33). It 
is the retention of the tone that has been. Each time-point is fixed, but it flies into 
the distance of consciousness. The distance from the generative ‘now’ becomes 
greater and greater (Husserl, 1991:27). 
It is essential to talk about the sensation of a tone to distinguish this from the tonal 
moment in retention, because they can seem very equal. As already mentioned, the 
tone ends, flows into retention, and sinks deeper into the past along with time. 
Retention is followed by more and more running-off modes. The same goes for the 
sensed tone. The sensation is followed by a tail of reverberation from the tone just 
sounded. The difference is that the running-off modes sinks into the past, the 
sensation does not.  
 
 
PART TWO 
 
Hitherto, we have accounted for Husserl's theories on the analysis of time-
consciousness, aiming to present it in a simplified, understandable manner. From 
here, this project will devote itself to a discussion of some of the more hard to grasp 
concepts in Husserl’s phenomenology that he uses to describe the internal time 
consciousness. As we see it, some of these concepts are open for discussion and 
need in our opinion to be elaborated on in order to fully comprehend them. This is 
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due to the fact that Husserl does not always make explicitly clear, their full 
potentials in phenomenology related to time-consciousness. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
5.1   PHANTASY 
The investigation of these concepts will have starting point in phantasy, as it is a 
term which is mentioned in context to several of Husserl’s concepts, but never fully 
elaborated on. In order to undertake a critique and analysis of Husserl’s terms, we 
came to a reflection upon his use of the term phantasy and how it is mentioned in 
his book. First the task has been to understand the choice of word that Husserl 
makes regarding phantasy; he both uses the term phantasy and the term 
imagination but he never elaborates on a distinction between the two. From this 
point a problematization of his use of the terms phantasy and imagination took 
departure. He mentions imagination and phantasy, but he never clearly distinct 
them from one another, nor unifies them as the same concept. This means that they 
are either: 
 
• Distinct, but never elaborated on 
• Used interchangeable 
• A translators issue – lost in translation 
 
We chose to concentrate on the option that they are used interchangeable since it 
would demand further elaboration from Husserl if they were distinct. Although 
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probable, it is highly unlikely to be a translators issue. Thus in the following the 
discussions on phantasy and imagination will be devoted to the term phantasy. It 
seems like Husserl uses the term phantasy only to explain his analysis of time 
consciousness and do not devote much space to further descriptions or discussions 
on phantasy. Still there are interesting points that opens up for reflection and 
discussion on the subject. One of these is the claim that Husserl makes regarding 
phantasy, and his argumentation on how it makes no sense to conclude that 
phantasy is unable to come up with something entire new. Husserl mentions 
phantasy in relation to memory to clarify his disagreements concerning Brentano’s 
analysis of time but he never really elaborates on it, and thus it can be argued 
exactly how influential it is for his analysis of time in general. It is not clarified what 
it means to Husserl’s general analysis of time consciousness as it serves more as 
sporadic examples. Still it is an interesting issue to reflect upon. When we here 
consider the issue of whether phantasy is able to come up with something ‘new’, 
one must be clear that it is in association to phenomenology and internal time 
consciousness. Initially, general discussions of phantasy led us to believe that is does 
not produce anything ‘new’ in consciousness. However, pertaining to the 
investigation of Husserl’s phenomenology and time-consciousness, the conclusion 
turned out to be somewhat different than first assumed. 
A short introduction to how Brentano uses phantasy in his descriptions of internal 
time consciousness is important, in order to describe the different stances that 
Husserl takes in regards to phantasy. Brentano stressed that there is only sensation 
and no perception in regards to succession and change. He explains how sensation 
can only endure as long as the stimulus does, when the stimulus ends, the phantasy 
will take over from sensation and in this way sensation produces in itself a 
‘phantasy-representation’ of the same content or almost the same content as the 
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sensation itself. In this manner, phantasy is enriched by temporal character. 
Brentano claims that it is an illusion when one imagines to still hear a tone which 
have just passed, and furthermore that this illusion is a product of phantasy 
(Husserl, 1991:13-14). In this manner Brentano argues that phantasy is only related 
to the past and not to the future. 
Husserl attempts to disprove Brentano’s argument regarding phantasy only being 
related to the past, by demonstrating its connection to both the past and the future 
in respectively: retention, protention, anticipation and recollection. He does that by 
describing how we are able to move about a perceived melody in other phases of 
our memory. He explains how one can recollect the melody after the first 
perception of it and afterwards modify it into a new melody, which is based on the 
earlier one. It is possible to do so do because of phantasy’s ability to form a 
representation in correlation to anticipation of the future out of the past (Husserl, 
1991:14). 
From this one can conclude that Husserl accepts that phantasy produces something 
entirely ‘new’, yet relying on earlier perceptions and structures. But what if we 
problematize this assumption and only accept ‘new’ to be entirely new and hence 
deny it to be based on earlier perceptions. Where is the line then between ‘new’ 
and between the already known? Husserl claims that one makes use of known 
sounds and in general known structures to invent something ‘new’ and proclaims 
this to be ‘new’. In our first discussions regarding phantasy we came to the 
conclusion that phantasy was not be able to come up with something entirely ‘new’. 
But after our understanding of Husserl’s acceptance of ‘new’ to be build on earlier 
structures and perceptions it is easy to follow his idea, and in this manner accept the 
claim that phantasy is able to come up with something ‘new’. In relation to time 
consciousness and phenomenology, Husserl does have a point regarding phantasy 
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being able to come up with ‘new’, but as we understand this complex assertion, it is 
all a question of where the line between ‘new’ and the already experienced goes. 
Contrasting ideas of Husserl’s definition of ‘new’ and our own is really the essence 
of the problem here. In conclusion we hold that Husserl’s definition of ‘new’, lacks a 
necessary distinction between entirely ‘new’ and ‘new’ based on perceptions 
already perceived. 
 
5.2   PHANTASY AND PERCEPTION AS PARALLELS? 
To this point we have described different of Husserl’s complex concepts, such as 
intentionality, now-points, primary and secondary memory. They all belong together 
inside the frames of phenomenology, but are some of them actually more similar 
than we somehow can see? Retention and protention can be attributed the same 
qualities as mentioned briefly earlier. Furthermore Husserl claimed that phantasy 
and perception contain the same characteristics. This discussion has been brought 
up in an article published in 2005 written by Julia Jansen from the department of 
Philosophy, University College Cork, Ireland, On the Development of Husserl’s 
Transcendental Phenomenology of Imagination and its use for Interdisciplinary 
Research. 
Jansen writes that according to Husserl, phantasy and perception are equal. 
Perception is a presentation in which the object appears to us in person as present, 
and phantasy is a presentification in which the object appears to us, not as present 
but as presentified. This means, that in perception the object appears to us as 
present in present, whereas the object in phantasy appears to us as if it were 
present. Thus phantasy by Husserl is described as quasi-perception. 
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Jansen does not agree with Husserl and calls phantasy a poor imitation of 
perception. She argues that his: “point is not supported by phenomenological 
evidence and are nothing more than unfounded assumptions” (Jansen, 2005:123). 
To elaborate on this further, that is whether or not perception and phantasy are 
similar, Jansen writes that Husserl understood phantasy as a type of pictorial 
presentation (Jansen, 2005:123). Picture-consciousness has been connected to 
pictorial presentation and involves three categories: The picture as physical object, 
the picture-object, and the picture-subject. Respectively they stand for the canvas or 
paper that somebody painted on, the figure that appears through a certain 
distribution of colours and shapes, and last, what is depicted on this canvas or paper 
(Jansen, 2005:123). 
Jansen quotes Husserl as following: “When we phantasize we intend some other 
thing than the appearing one, which can felt to be distinct from it and which 
pictorially represents it” (Husserl, 1980, cited in Jansen, 2005:124). 
According to Bernet, professor in philosophy at Leuven University in Belgium
12
, 
perceptive picture consciousness infers a double perception, which is a perception 
of the ‘pictorial object’ and the physical ‘picture-thing’, “in which the absent 
‘pictorial subject’ … is depicted and thereby achieves intuitive presence” (Husserl, 
1980 as cited in Bernet, 2002:332). The pictorial object is according to Bernet an 
apparent perception, while the pictorial subject is presented in its absence. The 
pictorial subject and the pictorial object do not belong in the same reality. According 
to Husserl’s early analysis of perception, there are two different perceptions of 
picture consciousness, one based on the other. The one perception is building on 
sensations and brings out the pictures and images; the other explains why the 
                                               
12
 ”Rudolf Bernet” May 24
th 
2009 - http://www.kuleuven.be/cv/u0007009e.htm  
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pictorial subject gives a visualisation in the pictorial object and thereby animates the 
phantasms. 
As aforementioned Husserl changed his belief in his later analysis of phantasial 
presentification. He changes the perspective from pictorial image towards 
remembering of a past present.  
 
As we at this point already know, a representation is a representation of something 
itself. But it can also be a pictorializing representation. What then is represented 
hovers around us in the form of an image, or it is pictorialized in phantasy-
appearance. 
An object can be intuited, which means that it gives an immediate representation of 
the object and brings it to appearance. An object can also be emptily represented, 
which has the same meaning as the intuition, except that it does not bring the 
object to appearance. And then the object can be presented symbolically, through 
signs. An empty representation can be a symbolic representation, where the object 
is pictorialized, made intuitable in an image, but not intuitively represented itself 
(Husserl, 1991:108).  
 
But Jansen criticises Husserl´s parallelism between perception and phantasy by 
saying that it can be considered as a justification for using phantasy as an illustrative 
model for experience in general (Jansen, 2005:123). Husserl says: “…the pure 
essence, can exemplify itself intuitively (…) in what is given in perception (…), but 
just as well as what is given in mere phantasy” (Husserl, 1950, cited in Jansen, 
2005:123). This means that the two terms are connected, but according to Jansen, if 
they really are parallel, then it must be evident. And in her article she claims, that 
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this quote is not supported by phenomenological evidence and are nothing more 
than unfounded consumptions. 
 
5.3   MEMORIES AND EXPECTATIONS 
Previously we have presented a scheme that provided an overview of the concepts in 
phenomenology that Husserl has introduced. The scheme is a simplified model of 
how one can understand the different concept’s placements in time, in connection to 
how close they are to the now-point. In this chapter our focal point will be a further 
elucidation on these concepts and a discussion of how Husserl presents them in 
connection to each other. There is a need for this since the distinctions he makes 
between the concepts, are not always clear and precise.  The complexity is at a 
different level compared to the usual linear understanding of time, we share.  
Moreover it is important to make an account of how they interact and differ in 
connection to the validity of Husserl’s division of points and durations in time 
internally perceived. One might find connections or parallels between concepts that 
after our apprehension of them do not seem obvious. A lot has to be said, the 
following will open up the discussion of where the line goes between retention and 
recollection in correlation to how we have interpreted it. Furthermore it also 
contains a consideration of why Husserl did not make this distinction and what it 
does for the overall comprehension of internal time-consciousness. 
 
 5.3.1    NEAR AND FAR MEMORIES 
For retention and recollection goes the same as for all the other concepts Husserl 
argues; they are all directions the consciousness stretches itself into (Elliott, 
2005:43). They are immanent in the internal consciousness of time. One of these 
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directions goes towards the past or more specific, towards now-points that have 
been but now have been modified and changed into retention. Husserl often refers 
to memory as retention but as we see it, it is not completely fulfilling since memory 
itself has two different directions, namely primary and secondary memory. In later 
paragraphs such as §19 in his work, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of 
internal time (1893-1917), he makes the distinction more explicit though, as we are 
doing now. What belongs to retention is close and fresh in memory. To exemplify 
this, think of how we are able to follow a conversation. The words just said are no 
longer now-points, but belongs to the past, but are still very close to the actual now-
point, and that is why a conversation makes sense to us. Otherwise it would just be a 
lot of words in an order we would not be able to comprehend. To return to the 
aforementioned scheme in chapter 4, understanding of duration, the concepts 
placed in the left side of the scheme are past events.  
Just exemplified is retention, which lies closest to the actual now-point. Recollection 
on the other hand lies further back in consciousness, and thus is literally placed 
beneath retention in the scheme. Husserl offers no clear distinction for when 
retention passes over and becomes recollection. Hence the question is whether the 
line between them are fluid and up for different interpretations or if he simply 
suggests that it is indefinable. As we understand it, to draw this line more explicitly, 
will be helpful for a more thorough understanding of how these concepts are 
intertwined, hence the following is an attempt to do so. 
The duration of events in the category of recollection is further away from the actual 
now-point than retention. They are events that actively must be presented or ‘called 
back’ in memory. That is things or events that happened long time ago, or simply as 
we would suggest, events that are separated in time. More precise, what we suggest 
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is that events which are separated in time are not necessarily separated as the actual 
world time dictates it, but as the internal time-consciousness determines it. What we 
propose here is that the duration of the event that took place is arguably of no 
importance for when it passes from retention to recollection, in as long as the event 
has not changed its purpose. Think of a conversation once more. The conversation 
might have lasted for three minutes or maybe three hours, if the content goes about 
the same topic or lies within the same field, we find it reasonable to believe that the 
whole conversation is stored in retention and have not changed to recollection. 
Naturally a reflection on where the fine balance between the two goes will arise, 
since a number of different situations can occur and each would arguably have to be 
discussed in order to determine where the division should be. Would it, for instance, 
still be retention in so forth the conversation goes about the same topic, but one 
would have problems remembering the beginning of the conversation as crispy clear 
as the words just said? Could it be plausible that only the last uttered sentence lies 
within retention, since remembering the exact words of former sentences might be 
difficult if not impossible?  
It could arguably also make sense to determine that the past event passes over to 
recollection when a change of actions occur. It is a slightly different way of explaining 
the abovementioned, but might add something to comprehension of this abstract 
construction of past points in our consciousness. When one action stops another will 
start, sometimes, if not every time, lapping over one another. To look at it this way 
does not solve the problem of drawing a clear and precise line for the transformation 
but as we argue, simplifies the understanding of it. This happens without touching 
the actual notion of time imbedded. 
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Once more, the line is hard to draw, and the question of how big impact it has on the 
overall understanding of our internal consciousness of time, is hard to tell. We have 
given our suggestion to where we understand Husserl made the distinction between 
primary and secondary memory, respectively retention and recollection. Husserl 
might not have put so much importance to this distinction, but our conclusion is that 
a more explicit distinction makes it more comprehensible.  
In the introduction to this section we raised the question whether or not the 
differences are thoroughly described and naturally it is not only the distinction 
between retention and recollection, but also as suggested by Husserl himself, 
between protention and anticipation, which in some ways act the same and work 
analogous to retention/recollection.  These are the main distinctions we are focusing 
on and the following takes up the discussion of protention and anticipation. 
 
 5.3.2    NEAR AND FAR FUTURE 
Expectation includes both protention and anticipation in the scheme suggested 
above.  As Husserl argues, retention and recollection are denoted as primary and 
secondary memory and thus belongs to the past. Husserl talks about protention and 
refers to it as expectation. Husserl indicates protention to be the near future and 
stresses that protention is called primary expectation (Husserl, 1991:41). In the 
scheme we have stated a suggestion; that a secondary expectation is to be called 
anticipation. Thus a distinction between protention and anticipation must be 
stressed as has been done with retention and recollection. Husserl does not devote 
much space to the introduction of protention and does not problematize a crossing 
from protention and into a future not connected to the present now-point. We find 
it important to explicitly state the importance of protention and expectations in 
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internal time consciousness. As already stated, protention as Husserl indicates, 
contains events in the very near future. We suggest that these events appear in the 
unconsciousness of one’s mind because they are so closely related to the now-point. 
Exemplified as following; it can be words one is about to add to a discussion or 
things in immediate continuation of the event taking place right now, things that will 
naturally follow the now-point without one’s reflection on this. One might even 
assume that we have an unconscious consciousness of the nearest future through 
protention. So without claiming second-sighted abilities to be true we seem to have 
found evidence for the plausibility of protention, and thus accept Husserl's concept 
of protention even though suggesting his lack of further elaboration on it. 
Anticipation on the other hand, includes events that, just as recollection in the past, 
must actively be presented. Anticipation as we have suggested being secondary 
expectation also belongs to the future, but not the nearest one. We denote 
anticipation as being placed in our conscious mind. An example on anticipation 
could be planning a holiday months ahead or considering what to make for dinner 
tonight. These events or actions are not in direct connection to the actual now-point 
and are, as in the case with retention and recollection, separated by actions that are 
not connected. Furthermore anticipation is also connected to secondary memory 
since it is rooted in earlier perceptions. 
 
5.4   APPREHENSION 
In conclusion, one final point of Husserl's phenomenology will have to be discussed 
in detail. Returning to his categorization of sensation and perception, feelings and 
secondary qualities such as pain, smells etc. are easily understandable and 
characterizable in that regard. However, a more abstract example of sensation, 
namely colors, complicates and expounds this division. This example seems to have 
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forced Husserl to change his stance towards previous categorizations of perceptions 
and sensations.  
Husserl seems to claim that they also exist in perception as a separate entity. 
However, it is only the perceived color which presents itself as a real thing, as for 
instance a red chair. Husserl argues: “The perceived red, not the sensed red, is a 
quality in the proper sense, that is, a determination of the appearing thing. The 
sensed red is called red only equivocally, for red is the name of a real quality” 
(Husserl, 1991:6). It is evident by this quote that, in contrast to the sensed red, the 
perceived red presents itself as a real appearing color.  
 
Classically, in philosophy, colors are conceived as a modification of the sense of 
sight. Tastes and smells also belonging to the senses. If we close our eyes, we could 
still perceive the color red, as the thought of what it is. Simply put: the color red. 
However, colors are closely connected to real-world objects. As we perceive these 
objects, their qualities are of course part of the object. Husserl puts it: “The data of 
place are related to appearing objective places just as the data of quality are related 
to appearing objective qualities” (Husserl, 1991:6). Objects as they appear to us do 
indeed contain qualities, but the question now is, how does one conceive, for 
example a red car in consciousness? Husserl answers this by introducing a concept 
labeled apprehension:  
 
“If, with reference to certain occurrences in phenomenology, we speak of a 
‘coinciding’ of one with the other, we must nevertheless note that it is only 
through the apprehension that the sensed red receives the value of a moment 
presenting the quality of a physical thing” (Husserl, 1991:7).  
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The taste of sugar or the red color of a car is part of an object in time. An 
immediate, seemingly automatic process, apprehension constitutes them in 
consciousness. Thus we can see apprehension in regards to color as presenting it as 
a quality. The same principle goes for tastes and smells. 
 
With the introduction of the concept apprehension, Husserl also distinguishes 
between sensed and perceived data. Or rather, he works with perceptions of 
‘sensation-content’. (Husserl, 1991:XXXII-XXXIII) When Husserl was describing 
‘sensed’ data as in Section A of his On the phenomenology of the consciousness of 
internal time (1893-1917), he was not very clear about what it encompasses. It is 
certain that he considered some sensations more immanent to consciousness than 
others, colors arguably being more immanent than pain. What strikes us now is 
whether there is a division for what is sensation-data and what is not. Husserl does 
not infer that there are uniform worlds of sensation and perception. However, 
elaborating on the subject, he seemingly implies that the physical sound of a tone is 
sensed data (Husserl, 1991:XXXII). Only through apprehension are we able to 
perceive this data:  
 
The sensed temporal data are not merely sensed; they are also <charged> 
with apprehension-characters, and to these in turn belong certain claims 
and temporal relations that appear on the basis of the sensed data, to 
bring them into this of that objective order, and to distinguish various 
apparent and actual orders (Husserl, 1991:13-14). 
 
The motivation for this description could be to avoid questions regarding perceived 
transcendent objects (Husserl, 1991:XXXII). For how can we perceive a red chair 
independent of our sensed-apprehended appearance of it? If that was the case, our 
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range of known objects would in fact be significantly limited. Thus apprehension 
seemingly serves as ‘the missing link’ between the empirical world and our 
conceptualization of the objects in it. However, as mentioned, it is problematic to 
comprehend Husserl's exact definition of sensations as he never clearly distincts or 
categorizes between what belongs to sensation and what is sensed-data. Arguably, 
it is hard to grasp pain as sensed-data, in the same way as the color red. Namely, to 
present the quality of an object to perception, as in our conception of a red car.  
 
What is clear is that we can perceive things in spite of change in their qualities. We 
simply switch from one way of perceiving the object, to the next or from perceiving 
the object one moment in time, to the next (Husserl, 1991:280). Although how this 
works is not really clarified, this is how Husserl's notion of perception worked (Smith 
& Smith, 1995:184).  In later writings Husserl mentions, in regards to tone-
sensations, that a certain adumbration takes place, causing the tone-sensation to 
become a perception of a tone. This adumbration causes the object to be perceived 
in its entirety or unity (Husserl, 1991:291-292). This is indicative of change of stance 
in Husserl's approach towards sensation and perception, which arguably makes 
unveiling his final stance on the subject extremely difficult. However, this should 
serve as a proposition to just that.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, Husserl's phenomenology is an intricate branch of time analysis. We 
have presented in simple terms what phenomenology is, and how it distincts itself 
from common analysis of time. We have presented and criticized topics essential to 
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the understanding of Husserl's phenomenological analysis of internal time-
consciousness. In the first part of the project, essential concepts of Husserl's 
phenomenology on internal time-consciousness have been outlined in an attempt to 
set up a steppingstone for further elucidation. The second part is rooted in this 
outline, and contains the further elaboration on the various subjects. In the process 
of uncovering Husserl's meaning of these topics, we came to the realization that 
some of these concepts were not made explicitly clear. Thus, we did provide 
suggestions to how they are to be understood or distinguished. This critique is 
justified, as the topics discussed in the second part have not been clearly accounted 
for in Husserl's complex work, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of 
internal time (1893-1917). In order to fully understand Husserl's phenomenology, 
critical assessment and expounding on the terms: retention, protention, 
recollection, anticipation and apprehension were necessary. Different approaches 
have been taken to this critique, consisting mostly of our own description and 
elaboration on these subjects, but also looking at those of Julia Jansen in relation to 
perception and phantasy. The critique was not meant to determine in absolute 
terms how these complex concepts function individually and in connection to one 
another, but served as a proposal to how they could function and connect. Seen as a 
whole, what this project has shown is Husserl's intentions to give: ”(...) a careful 
description of one's experience of time, but he also wants to give an account of the 
essential necessities embedded in that experience” (Husserl, 1991:XXVIII). 
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GROUP DYNAMICS 
Our first task as a group of eight students was to find a common approach to the 
project. The guidelines as given from our supervisor were clear, so we were not 
confronted with big problems in this process. Early in the process we were able to 
form a problem definition and delimit our project, which gave certain calmness 
within the group and in the light of this a good working climate. The size of the 
group was within the first month and a half, heavily reduced due to two dropouts 
and a change of interest, which left us five people but intensified our discussions, 
since the voice of one person can easier be heard in a group of five than in a group 
of eight. This, along with our growing knowledge on the field gave birth to many 
useful philosophical discussions.   
As this is our second project at Roskilde University, working together in a group was 
not completely new but still a different experience from last project. We believe 
that this project has strengthened our cooperative skills and we feel well equipped 
for another project at Roskilde University. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
Projektet er baseret på Edmund Husserls forelæsninger fra 1905, On the 
phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917).  Projektet er 
todelt. Den første del består af en redegørelse for Husserls fænomenologi og 
specifikke begreber indenfor denne. Den anden del er en diskussion og kritik af 
enkelte af disse begreber, da en sådan var nødvendig for besvarelsen af vores 
problemformulering. Begreberne diskuteret og kritiseret er blandt andre hvor 
skellet mellem ’recollection’ og ’retention’ eller mellem ’protention’ og 
’anticipation’ går. Ydermere diskuterer vi hvorvidt fantasien kan levere noget nyt 
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som ikke er baseret på tidligere indtryk og erfaringer. Projektet giver en generel 
beskrivelse af Husserls fænomenologi i forhold til intern tidsbevidsthed.   
Projektet dækker følgende dimensioner, Subjektivitet & Læring samt Videnskab og 
Filosofi.   
 
ABSTRACT 
The project is based on Edmund Husserl’s lectures from 1905, On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). The project is 
twofold; the first part is an account of Husserl’s branch of phenomenology. The 
second part consists of a discussion- and critique of some of the concepts in his 
phenomenology, which was needed to answer our problem definition. Discussions 
were among others, a distinction between recollection and retention, and 
protention and anticipation. Furthermore we discussed whether or not phantasy 
can provide something new, not based on earlier perceptions. An overall description 
of Husserl´s phenomenology in relation to how one perceives time internally is 
provided. 
The dimensions covered are Science & Philosophy and also Subjectivity & Learning.   
